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The Problems of the Defining the Risk: the Case of 
Mountaineering 
Viviane Seigneur ∗ 
Abstract: A central assumption in sociology is that the 
view on the risk is essentially a construction rather than a 
strictly objective perspective. However, this approach has a 
tendency to forget objective knowledge and tangible facts.  
Our research on risks in high mountains compares the avail-
able information on risks (scientific literature, safety infor-
mation, media coverage and political discourse) with our 
empiric observations. Our work shows that there are differ-
ences caused by lack of fundamental reflection on the defi-
nition of the risk as a social construction. We propose to re-
consider the definition of the risk with concepts closely 
connected to risk such as: uncertainty, emotion, phobia and 
danger, and to point out problems of confusion in several 
works of authors (e.g. those dealing with sensational activ-
ity, such as bungee jumping, as if it was dangerous). 
1. Introduction 
Currently, the theme of risk continues to attract increasing attention and re-
search on risks follows this trend. However, analysis within studies on risks is 
not always developed in a very rigorous way. This paper will focus on prob-
lems with defining risk, in particular in the French-speaking literature. Filing 
behaviours that are dangerous, suicidal, criminal, marginal etc., under the same 
notion of “risk-taking” must alert us to the scientific evolution of a definition of 
                                                          
∗  Address all communications to: Viviane SEIGNEUR, Groupe de Recherche Innovations et 
Sociétés, Université de Rouen, France. Centre interdisciplinaire scientifique de la mon-
tagne, Université de Savoie, 284 Chemin des Favrands, 74 400 Chamonix, France ; e-mail: 
viviane.seigneur@tiscali.fr. 
First published: Seigneur, Viviane (2006, January). The Problems of the Defining the Risk: 
The Case of Mountaineering [27 paragraphs]. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research [On-line Journal], 7(1), Art. 14. 
Available at: http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs-texte/1-06/1-06-14-e.htm. 
 246
risks and on some limits of the constructivist viewpoint. This viewpoint can 
generate typical traps, such as qualifying “risk-taking” for behaviour actually 
quite safe that is misunderstood or not recognised as such. 
Moreover, the qualification “risk-taking” tends to discredit some categories 
of people. Thus, some populations are easily stigmatized, also by the scientists. 
Marc SOUVILLE’s example (2003) of AIDS illustrates this well. He shows 
how false knowledge cultivated by fear and transported by rumours actually 
influences health professionals. The rationality of the medical knowledge is 
weakened by unbridled phobias associated with the illness and its stereotypes 
(such as homosexuals, prostitutes and drug addicts). The link between risk and 
transgression or marginality is clearer then. Off-piste skiers and the snow-
boarders experience this kind of spin. Indeed, the image of the off-piste skiers 
or snowboarders is frequently associated with dangerous transgressive or at 
least criticisable behaviour. Jean Marie BROHM evokes the dangers of sports 
for fanatics (1995), for example new sports in the mountains. But the link be-
tween this kind of winter sports and transgression is clearer in the works of 
Alain LORET (1996). LORET argues that these attitudes do not abide by the 
law or social rules. Some of the people skiing and surfing off-piste were ar-
rested by the French police, but then quickly set free because justice was un-
able to justify this action. Françoise SERVOIN points out this lack of legal 
justification in the case of snowboarders (1999).  
In our opinion, the confusion between the case of particular winter sports 
and transgressive behaviour is the main explanation of this abuse. In reality, 
some preconceptions from the current language corrupt mislead researchers 
and magistrates. High mountains are particularly propitious to the development 
of our general thinking and provide our comments with various illustrations. 
Our ground is often described as an extreme place but we prefer to be more 
precise and neutral. We will, however, observe that the concept of “extreme” is 
not fit for scientific use, indeed.  
2. Visiting High Places  
Initially, let us specify that the social representations just cover a part of reality 
of alpine surroundings. This is reinforced by the fact that most people are never 
in this area and the difference between the real high mountain and social per-
ceptions is particularly prominent.  
This inventory of social perceptions is especially helpful when becoming 
aware of a second range of differences between risks and their social percep-
tion. Some authors like DUCLOS (1989) studied tendencies to overestimate or 
underestimate risks. The perceptions of risks in high mountains undergo strong 
distortions and provide some examples close to caricature. Before we start 
defining our approach to high mountains, we have to specify that it is a mythi-
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cal environment. The myth is reinforced by quite limited knowledge owing to 
few visits.  
Actually, the summits and the climbers stimulate the social imagination, and 
the danger of this exotic universe, more or less real, inspires many of precon-
ceptions. However, we observe that the preconceptions also exist in lay and 
scientific perceptions. Researchers cannot easily access the high mountain 
areas, and therefore their work is based more on comments about this environ-
ment than on concrete, direct and long observations. Often, these comments 
misrepresent dangers like the omnipresent mortal avalanche quite uncommon 
in reality and the apathy1 in connection with much more ordinary heart attacks 
during a hike in the mountains. The French mass media “keeps the books” of 
mortal accidents involving climbers in the Mont Blanc Massif, but very seldom 
mentions mortal accidents of hikers.2 
3. Evaluation of the Risks and Risk Evaluations  
Moreover, these distortions impinge upon the debate about safety and about the 
ways in which risks are “brought to life”, a phenomenon that in turn raises the 
issue of how risk can be strictly defined and how the notion of risk is manipu-
lated.  
As Ulrich BECK has pointed out, “the scope, the urgency and the existence 
of risk evolve as criteria and interests become more diverse” (BECK 2001, 
p.55), but it must not be forgotten that, in its strictest sense, risk is defined as a 
potential and more or less foreseeable danger.  
In order to be able to talk about risk behaviour, a person must “expose 
him/herself to a non-negligible possibility of injury or death, of damaging 
his/her own future, or of putting his/her health in danger” (LE BRETON 2002, 
p.61). There must, therefore, be a more or less plausible link with danger. A 
risk is taken when it is impossible to predict what will happen: there is a poten-
tial for danger. However, a large amount of work has been carried out on “risk” 
in situations where there is no real danger. For example, Patrick PERRETTI 
WATEL’s work (2003) on deliberate risk taking looks at a number of different 
activities, including bungee jumping and fairground rides, which provide 
thrills, but are nevertheless completely safe. Sometimes researchers put them-
selves in a paradoxical situation by talking about risk behaviours and at the 
                                                          
1  Here we refer to Peter SANDMAN (1994) and his concept of apathy. The social responses 
to risk (from apathy to panic) depend on the risk perception more or less ordinary. 
2  When we checked the Le Monde newspaper database, we found eight articles that dealt 
with “death+alpinism” and two articles that evoked “death+hiking” during the same period 
of time. Nevertheless, the number of deaths for hikers and for climbers is roughly the same 
in the Mont Blanc Massif in summer. Death involving climbers received four times more 
media coverage in comparison to hikers. 
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same time stating that there is no danger. Cécile MARTHA’s research into 
bolt-protected rock-climbing states: “These factors are most notably character-
ised by the fear of falling, even though falling is not dangerous given the fall-
arrest systems that climbers use (…)” (2003, p.58).  
From our point of view, this type of ambiguous comment is generated by a 
failure to take into account the role of the affect in the definition of risk. How-
ever, research into the subject, such as that carried out by Paul SLOVIC (1981, 
1999), shows that the affect is an essential factor in the evaluation of risk. 
Some situations evoke fear or indignation and these emotions play a very im-
portant role in these situations being considered risky.  
Due to this tendency to confuse danger with other elements, such as phobias 
or thrills, the concept of risk is generally presented in an equivocal light. Even 
though phobias and thrills can be experienced in situations were there is no 
danger, there is a tendency for the producer of the stress-producing fear to 
“become” a danger and for thrill seeking to “become” a risk behaviour. The 
image of adventure races is based on just this ambiguity, as Marianne 
BARTHELEMY has noted:  
The ingredients of the adventure are judiciously chosen and often stage-
managed to stir the imagination. The incertitude of the challenge, combined 
with the difficult race conditions and the distant and hostile environment that 
is chosen for most of the adventure races considered difficult, make the out-
come uncertain and turn the event into an adventure. Although participants of-
ten let themselves get carried away by the illusion of risk, they are not fools 
and are well aware that the outcome of the race will never be fatal (2003, 
p.84).  
The adventure race approach thereby raises the question of what is at the 
origin of this misconstruction. Here it seems that the uncertainty mentioned by 
BARTHELEMY has a role to play.  
4. Horror Vacui and Vertigo  
Uncertainty describes situations were the outcome is partially or completely 
unforeseeable, with some possible outcomes involving a potential risk. Conse-
quently, there are two distinct facets to uncertainty. On the one hand, uncer-
tainty suggests the possibility of risk. The link between risk and uncertainty has 
appeared quite frequently in articles on the sociology of risk, from Anthony 
GIDDENS (1994) to Ulrich BECK (2001) and BONSS and ZINN (2003). 
However, whilst the concept of uncertainty is an important element in the soci-
ology of risk, it is also an important part of action theory. In fact, uncertainty 
appears in any situation where choices have to be made based on information 
that is incomplete and does not allow the evolution of a situation to be clearly 
determined. Therefore, uncertainty appears in forms that, to a greater or lesser 
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extent, prevent people, institutions or societies from acting. Thus, the concept 
of uncertainty is delimited by the fields of risk and of action (or other ele-
ments). When defined in such a way, this concept strongly represents the most 
prosaic idea of adventure. 
Mountaineering adventure is a major theme in the high mountains. To go 
into the high mountains is undoubtedly an adventure, but more because the 
climber is moving towards the unknown, and not because he/she is exposing 
him/herself to danger. The difficulty of the adventure lies in the difficulty of 
carrying out actions and of not succumbing to indecisiveness. Far from the 
image of daring-do, the adventure in mountaineering does not generally come 
from a search for risk in any form. In reality, the adventure comes from the 
moments of doubt that climbers frequently experience rather than from a “close 
and permanent relationship with danger”.3 Mountaineers stand out because of 
their ability to make decisions and carry them through despite a high level of 
uncertainty, rather than because of a willingness to take risks. The idea of ad-
venture is therefore much more closely linked to uncertainty than to risk. 
Moreover, the word “adventure” does not only express this combination of 
risk and uncertainty, it is used to cover many different circumstances. As some 
writers who have theorised about adventure4 have noted, the word “adventure” 
refers more to the social representation of a situation than to a real situation. 
These remarks highlight the ambiguity behind the thirst for “adventure”, which 
has increased so spectacularly over the last 25 years due to the perpetuation of 
this very misconception.  
The attractiveness of “adventure” has developed through a specific market 
and a very specific definition of the word. Thus, the increasing number of 
adventure races and adventure parks shows a taste for “guaranteed thrills”. The 
“adventurer” comes to play with his/her phobias, but under no circumstances to 
take a risk. The “adventure” is certain, the thrills are guaranteed, and the activ-
ity is completely safety. In fact, the adventure market has developed as a half-
way house between a fun fair (for the kind of the device) and climbing Everest 
(for the image). Society’s definition of adventure has thus become the confron-
tation with a phobia in a more or less natural-seeming environment. Clearly, 
this idea of adventure has eliminated the parameter that should most character-
ise it; i.e. uncertainty. Society consumes this “adventure”, but remains as 
strongly averse as ever to any idea of uncertainty. In reality, the “adventure” 
market offers simulations of adventure in which thrills and programmed pho-
bias have replaced discomfort (or even pain) and chance. It is this symbolic 
slight of hand that is at the origin of the misconception on which the “thrill 
market” is based and which allows customers to “consume an adventure” 
through a stage-managed challenge. That being said, the fact that some risk 
analysts have been taken in by such stage-managed scenes is a real problem, as 
                                                          
3  This is the BAUDRY’s definition of the Alpinism in Le Corps extrême (1999). 
4  Like Vladimir JANKELEVITCH (1976) or Georg SIMMEL (2002). 
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it perpetuates the confusion between an adventure and the commercialisation of 
an “adventure” label. On a fundamental level, it maintains the impression, 
which is firmly anchored in the affect, that phobia and danger are one and the 
same thing.  
5. Scientific Concept and Sensationalism  
An analysis of the term “extreme” leads to a similar conclusion as the analysis 
of “adventure”. The French sociology of risk seems to have adopted these 
terms without removing the preconceptions of everyday language. Thus Patrick 
BAUDRY describes “extreme behaviours” as:  
going beyond the limits (…) is less about conquering the forces of nature than 
putting oneself at their mercy (…) than abandoning oneself to their power, to 
these wild elements: taking part in the delirium of an all powerful Mother Na-
ture (1999, p.143).   
It could be asked whether this description actually refers to a real situation 
or to a phantasm-based image and whether the author is merely describing the 
image propagated by the media rather than real behaviours. Conversely, Pierre 
André RHEM5 described a much more pragmatic idea of the extreme: “Today, 
the word “extreme” is used to add spice to any dish. Currently, the term does 
not mean very much, other than to advertisers who are looking to create an 
image for their brands” (SEIGNEUR, 1997, p.109). The notions of “extreme” 
and “adventure” are part and parcel of the way the media covers mountaineer-
ing, but, at the same time, they cloud the understanding of real behaviours in 
the field. In order to clear the observation, it is useful to invoke the notion of 
phobia.   
Phobias shed light on the ways in which risks are constructed. A phobia is 
an anxiety or fear triggered by an object or a situation that is not in itself dan-
gerous (UNESCO, 1983, p.107). In the high mountains, phobias include anxie-
ties generated by heights, uncertainty or the cold, with vertigo being the most 
obvious example. In this case, “the existence” of the danger is essentially due 
to the affective power of the fear of heights, and not to the evaluation of real 
danger. Thus, a climber who does not seem to be frightened of heights may be 
considered a “death-dodger”, or a lover of risk: even though there may be no 
real danger, the impressionable external observer is often convinced of the 
opposite. The French Himalayan climber Yannick SEIGNEUR refuted the 
liking for risk when he explained his connection with risk: “I didn’t like to take 
                                                          
5  Pierre André RHEM was a mountain guide, as was his father. He specialised in activities 
that are often referred to as “extreme”, although he did not consider himself an “extreme” 
sportsman. He was a base jumper (a type of free-fall parachuting that involves jumping 
from the top of a cliff or structure and opening the parachute at the last minute) and snow-
boarder who enjoyed the challenge of steep slopes. 
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risk. I always tried to eliminate the risk in my practice. I never enjoy taking 
risk” (SEIGNEUR, 1997, p.111). A number of possible attitudes to phobias can 
be adopted, ranging from complete aversion to attraction. Phobias can be 
sources of satisfaction or unpleasantness, depending on whether they are re-
garded as a barrier to overcome or a limit not to be crossed. 
Of all the possible responses to a phobia, the contra-phobic attitude appears 
to be one of the most important. This notion describes an individual defence 
mechanism where exposure to the phobia is no longer avoided but sought out.6 
The high mountain environment tends to promote this type of attitude, espe-
cially with respect to vertigo, the cold and the unknown (or the uncertain). The 
pleasure that a contra-phobic attitude can bring comes from successfully facing 
up to one’s fears rather than from the thrill of cheating death. The satisfaction 
comes from overcoming anxiety rather from the sharpening of the senses that 
comes from putting one’s life at risk. However, studies of contra-phobic atti-
tudes often fail to distinguish between fear and danger. For example, Christine 
LE SCANFF looks at the contra-phobic attitude in mountaineering, but at the 
same time she evokes “the direct confrontation with a danger that is often life-
threatening” (2002, p.60). Clearly, there is some confusion between phobia and 
danger, and the distinction between a contra-phobic attitude and ordalic behav-
iour7 has not been made. In fact, ordalic behaviour appears to be more a con-
struct of the dramatic imagination than a real behaviour. That is to say, the 
theme of the mountains as an ordeal figures much less in real activities than in 
the way these activities are presented by the media and by the “thrills” and 
“adventure” market. Comments by participants in high mountain activities once 
again refute the idea that mountaineers or other “extreme” sports people see 
any meaning in exposing themselves to danger. When asked the question “How 
do climbers feel about risk in the mountains”, Jérôme RUBY8 replied, “It is 
something you accept. There is a difference between risk and commitment. 
When there are objective9 dangers, you are faced with a choice. Therefore, … 
by choice, I would prefer not to die in the mountains!” (SEIGNEUR, 1997, 
                                                          
6  The contra phobic attitude takes hold in childhood. For example, parents throw their child 
into the air and catch it when it starts to come back down. The thrill of the fall and the de-
scent controlled by the parent transcends the fear of falling and becomes a source of pleas-
ure. The concept of the contra phobic attitude, which is described in de FESTA’s thesis 
(1987), comes from dynamic psychology, but it can be said to have become sociologically 
rooted in a culture of pushing one’s limits that is related to social phenomena such as: The 
Cult of Performance, subject and title of Alain EHRENBERG’s book (1991). 
7  The modern ordeal is no longer a collective, judicial or cultural rite, but an individual 
undertaking. It is an unconscious process in which an actor “asks” for death, through the 
intermediary of risk taking, whether his existence still has meaning. This concept is most 
notably supported by David LE BRETON (1991, 1995, 2002). 
8  Jérôme RUBY is a mountain guide who base jumps and snowboards down steep slopes, but 
who, like his colleague A. P. RHEM, does not see himself as an “extreme” sportsman. 
9  In mountaineering jargon, objective dangers are those due to the environment, rather than 
those caused by climbers themselves e.g. serac falls, collapse of snow bridges, etc. 
 252
p.112). The Swedish Tomas OLSSON, media skier and distinguished by his 
performances on steep slopes and the highest summits all over the world, an-
swers to the question: Which danger did you feel during your last expedition at 
26, 906 feet without oxygen and mainly done alone? “I was never exposed 
directly to danger during this expedition but I felt a feeling of vulnerability. 
This feeling is good in order to still be prudent and concentrated in high alti-
tude” (SEIGNEUR 2004, p.10). As can be seen, a much more finely nuanced 
point of view is expressed by participants in “extreme” sports, in that they do 
not look for confrontations with obvious risks, rather they reject such an atti-
tude and see no particular sense in taking risks. Once again, it seems that some 
analysts have confused the views of those involved with views about those 
involved, and analyses that look at ordalic behaviours generally mix the two 
together.  
6. Pulp Fiction  
In the final analysis, it seems that a risk behaviours approach, and especially an 
ordalic behaviours approach, cannot answer the following question: “How 
much of the phenomenon being studied is tangible and how much is fictional?” 
The media image of mountaineering, mock adventures, stage-managed chal-
lenges and all the other dramatised activities undoubtedly need to be ap-
proached from a “social fiction” point of view. By social fiction, we mean all 
the tales, images and myths that have built up within a society. Anthropologists 
such as Georges BALANDIER (1984) and Marc AUGE (2000) have shown 
that the importance of fiction comes from is its ability to bring meaning and 
emotion to the movements of identification or repulsion. 
In the domain of the high mountains, Jean Paul BOZONNET (1992) has de-
ciphered the origins and roles of certain fictions. The ways in which risk and 
the heroic are portrayed are intimately linked to the fact that the mountains are 
seen as a place of initiation in the collective imagination. BOZONNET shows 
that the general perception of mountain sports is strongly influenced by the 
notion of danger, thus the idea of venturing into the mountains assumes the 
ambivalent character of an initiation, an initiation that always lies between 
attraction and repulsion.  
This ambiguous fascination for the initiatory mountains directly feeds a he-
roic mythology that is greatly reinforced by the media and by advertisers ac-
cording to a precisely defined system of symbols.  
“The media relies on the collective imagination in a rather ambiguous way. 
For example, none of the advertising for winter sports mentions the day-to-day 
risks of being in the mountains. It eliminates the unpleasant aspects of the 
climate, and the weather itself has become a taboo subject. It is obvious that 
tour operators would not want to scare away customers. On the other hand, 
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newspapers give a lot of column inches to spectacular accidents and mountain-
eering tragedies. This insistence on the dangers of minority activities, such as 
climbing10, provides a cheap way of pumping up the average tourist, who can 
feel part of the heroic adventure when skiing on groomed slopes or walking 
along signposted footpaths. The double intention of erasing the minor, but real 
risks and emphasising the great, but imaginary dangers is connected to the 
increasing numbers of visitors to the mountains and to a more and more wa-
tered-down initiatory experience” (ibid, p.206).  
The fiction manifested here is most clearly seen in the adventure-park, ad-
venture race and bungee jumping domains. These fictions allow people’s he-
roic aspirations to be met in a way that is effective, but entirely symbolic in that 
the danger aspect has been removed.  
Once it is accepted that this type of activity does not involve any real dan-
ger, the place of danger in activities that actually involve risk can also be quali-
fied! In fact, there have been very few attempts to quantify the dangers of 
mountaineering because the data is difficult to compile. Therefore, we have 
calculated the mortality rate for climbers during scientific expeditions.11 Acon-
cagua, the example given here, cannot be regarded as being representative of 
the high mountains in general, because danger levels are very specific to each 
mountain and circumstances. However, these figures show that even for expe-
ditions to the greater ranges, the high mountains can no longer be regarded as 
charnel houses. The ordinary route is the easiest and most frequently climbed 
route to the summit of Aconcagua, and it has a mortality rate of 4,63/1000. The 
more difficult “Polish glacier” attracts different climbers than the ordinary 
route and has a significantly lower mortality rate of 0,45/1000.  
Thus, some behaviours are regarded as being “risky”, whereas the risks from 
others are rarely considered. In reality, this difference in treatment does not 
come from the level of danger or risk but from the significance that specialists 
give to the activity being analysed. From significance to values is but a small 
step, and one that is frequently taken. Because, as was pointed out in the intro-
duction, the qualification “risky” is rarely free from normative arbitrations and 
value judgements.  
                                                          
10  Which proves to be a low risk activity with an exceptionally low mortality rate. 
11  Our research in the field (outside the Alps) were undertaken with the help of scientific 
expeditions with 90 days in the Andes and 70 days in the Himalayas. The figures given here 
are for Aconcagua, which lies in Argentina, near the border with Chile. At 6962 metres, this 
is the highest mountain on the American continent. Source: death certificates and the num-
ber of climbing permits issued over ten years by the Aconcagua Park 
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7. Conclusion: The Dark Side of the Mountain  
Fundamentally, there are obvious institutional values behind the qualification 
“risky”, the socio-cultural mechanisms of which have been described by 
DOUGLAS and WILDAVSKY (1982, 1999) or LUPTON and TULLOCH 
(2003). Inevitably, the understanding of risk and risk-taking is affected by the 
cultural environment in which it develops, as well as by personal experience. 
Therefore, the use of the narrow term “risky” to describe heterogeneous, and 
sometimes rather irrelevant elements seems to indicate that certain agents are 
“endeavouring to manipulate the visions of the world” (BOURDIEU, 1987, 
p.129) and trying to impose their own vision of the world. The feeling of inse-
curity that is so lauded by the collective imagination has led several analysts to 
conclude that all risks should be avoided. Because of this, those who go into 
the high mountains are inevitably dubbed risk-takers, or worse, transgressors. 
The qualification “risky” for mountaineering, off-piste skiing or for new forms 
of skiing is, from this perspective, a condemnation of the participants. Thereby, 
analysts of the extreme, ordeals and other fictions, to a greater or lesser extent 
“write off” activities that they know almost nothing about. The love of the 
mountains, exploration, pushing personal limits, applying one’s technical 
prowess and the values of traditions are among the many cultural elements that 
fall through the net. Furthermore, as the climbers are usually considered 
“anomic” (i.e. their “lack of socialisation” being responsible for their “strange” 
activities), serious analysis of the socio-cultural content of these “risk” activi-
ties is pushed further to one side. Finally, the distance from reality that is seen 
in many of the descriptions of these so-called behaviours is rising: the in situ 
observation of an activity in the high mountains that has a constant and close 
relationship with death remains to be done.  
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